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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from a final [Judgment entered 
pursuant to a bench trial held on June 22, 1990. 
Judgment was entered on July 25, 1990. The Utah Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate tfye appeal pursuant 
to U.C.A., §78-2-2(3) (j) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Does §57-1-32, U.C.A. appj.y to Associates 
Financial Services as a non-foreclosing] junior lienholder 
when Associates bid at the foreclosure Isale of the senior 
1 
lienor, but was redeemed out of the property prior to 
commencement of the lawsuit? 
Since this matter was heard as a bench trial (see 
Appendix "C") and not as a summary judgment, the standard 
for review of the evidence is to be in a light most 
favorable to the prevailing party at the bench trial. 
There is to be no reversal of the decision of the trial 
court on the facts, only if there was an error of law. 
Charlton v. Hackett. 11 Ut.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961); 
Briaham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 470 P.2d 393, 24 Ut.2d 
292 (1970) . Since the appeal presents only questions of 
law, the court should review the trial court's rulings 
for correctness and accord no particular deference to the 
appellant. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 752 P.2d 585 (Ut 1988). 
2. Should the fair market value of real estate 
sold at a foreclosure sale on a senior lien be examined 
pursuant to §57-1-32, U.C.A. under a non-deficiency 
action taken by Associates Financial Services, the junior 
lienor, when Associates was not the title holder to the 
real estate at the time of the commencement of the action 
for collection of the balance due under its note? 
2 
The standard for review of the evidence is to be in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party from the 
trial court. The decision of the trial court should not 
be reversed unless there is an error of [Law. Charlton v. 
Hackett. supra; Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, Isupra. The legal 
conclusions of the trial court should be reviewed for 
correctness. Mountain Fuel Supply vJ Salt Lake City 
Corp., supra. 
3. As a purchasing junior lienor at the 
foreclosure sale of a senior lien, is Associates barred 
from action against appellants pursuant to §78-37-1, 
U.C.A. when Associates was redeemed out of the property 
prior to the commencement of the lawsujit? 
The standard for review of the evidence is to be in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party from the 
trial court. The decision of the tria^ . court should not 
be reversed unless there is an error of law. Charlton v. 
Hackett, supra; Moon Lake Elec. Assfn, supra. The legal' 
conclusions of the trial court shoultf be reviewed for 
correctness. Mountain Fuel Supply v\. Salt Lake City 
Corp.f supra. 
3 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
U.C.A., §57-1-32 
At any time within three months after any 
sale of property under a trust deed, as 
hereinabove provided, an action may be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon the 
obligation for which the trust deed was given 
as security, and in such action the complaint 
shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust 
deed, the amount for which such property was 
sold, and the fair market value thereof at the 
date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the 
court shall find the fair market value at the 
date of sale of the property sold* The court 
may not render judgment for more than the 
amount by which the amount of the indebtedness 
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, 
including trustee's and attorney's fees, 
exceeds the fair market value of the property 
as of the date of the sale. In any action 
brought under this section, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to collect its costs 
and reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
bringing an action under this section. 
U.C.A., §78-37-1 
There can be one action for the recovery 
of any debt or the enforcement of any right 
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate 
which action must be in accordance with the 
provision of this chapter. Judgment shall be 
given adjudging the amount due, with costs and 
disbursements, and the sale of mortgage 
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy 
said amount and accruing costs, and directing 
the sheriff to proceed and sell the same 
according to the provisions of law relating to 
sales on execution, and a special execution or 
4 
order of sale shall be issued for that 
purpose. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This c^se is an appeal by appellants, Franklin L. 
Slaugh and Cheryl D. Slaugh from a final judgment entered 
pursuant to a bench trial held on Jui}e 22, 1990. The 
parties stipulated to the facts of th£ case and agreed 
that the matter could be tried on the basis of oral 
arguments of counsel only. R.147. Tl^ e court, pursuant 
to the bench trial, entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and an Order and Ju4gment. R.152-158. 
The defendants did not object to the tfacts set forth in 
the Findings of Fact which had been stipulated to at the 
bench trial. The Judgment against defendants is for the 
sum of $26,089.71, together with interest in the sum of 
$3,848.13 and for attorney's fees in the amount of 
$3,000.00, for a total judgment of |$32,935.84, which 
judgment shall bear interest at the ratje of 18% per annum 
from and after July 25, 1990. (See Appendix "A"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts which are set forth ifi the Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law (which had been stipulated 
5 
to at the bench trial of June 22, 1990) are as follows: 
R. 147, 152-155. 
1. Defendants, Franklin and Cheryl Slaugh 
(Slaughs), entered into a loan agreement with Plaintiff, 
Associates Financial Services (Associates), on or about 
November 26, 1982. 
2. The loan agreement included a note in the 
amount of $33,104.14, plus interest accruing as shown in 
the Note. 
3. The note was secured by a trust deed on real 
property located at 8 62 0 South Gladiator Way, Sandy, 
Utah. 
4. The lien of Associates was a second mortgage* on 
the property. 
5* The senior lien was in favor of Utah Mortgage 
Loan Corporation (Utah Mortgage). 
6. Prior to February of 1989, Slaughs went into 
default on the Utah Mortgage trust deed but did not go 
into default on the Associates trust deed. 
7. Because of Slaughs default, Utah Mortgage 
commenced a non-judicial foreclosure and eventually 
conducted a trustee's sale on the real property. 
6 
M, "I'lie trustee's sale occurred1 on February 28, 
,1989 is,snc i ates appeared at the sale land bid an amount 
of $26,000,00 as the high bid Tlho amour ow i»»'i ty. iitah 
Mortgage was approximately $20,000.00 at the time of the 
sale-
""- ~ -—"»--- of thr real property at the time ot 
sale wcio lUw- *- c although the exact market 
value has n„ \ - - >.<i 
10. At the time of * t* *orecl >su£e sale there were 
- * ^->' •! £" J*= - i *-av l1^"? aaunot Slaaghs which were 
also i;e:,b cne rea. es* ite. 
11. The branch manager of Associates, who attended 
t. - actual] ncv • - -UC the federal tax 
lien** j.inougb tne> : recor.;. 
12. •.• sociates' f i In , n -. ldjgiv* was In Dallas, 
Tex- * ile dicJ ~ -<=- * - — 
of a t, *.
 tt= report tuat identniea \,.o reaer... 
13 Under federal law, the IRS has a 12 c-day right 
c - J ru:"*:e 5 - when •» ' «r ' - xn 
p^ace. nb c; * c:_- ., . ; ^ ; ;ah+" nr .caempiion. 
the IPS paid Associates tht- sum of $26,0C - within 1 20-
d * ' 
7 
14. -The IRS took title to the real property under 
the redemption and wiped out any interest of Associates 
in the property. The net proceeds of the redemption to 
Associates was approximately $5,700.00, which amount was 
applied to the account of Slaughs to reduce the balance 
owing. 
15. The balance of the Note and Trust Deed, after 
redemption, was the sum of $26,089.71, together with 
interest from September 1989 pursuant to the terms of the 
Note. 
16. No payments have been made by Slaughs to 
Associates since the redemption by the IRS. 
17. The Note provided for an award of attorney's 
fees in the event it is necessary to enforce collection 
of the Note. 
(See Appendix lfBfl for the stipulated Findings of 
Fact.) 
Based upon the foregoing stipulated facts, Appellee 
disputes the following statement of fact found at pages 
4 and 5 of the Appellants1 Brief: 
It was stipulated that the value of the real 
property at the time of sale was more than $4 0,000.00, 
8 
although the exact market value had not teen established. 
Therefore, the representa*- ^ of appellants In paragraph 
"(e)" as to a spec 1 tic . . L^- • - i 
amount owing to Associate • " • •• time of sale is 
'• *ppr . :. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ince Associate? Financial Services was a 
1
 -" / 
i* is no* cjoverned toy the deficiency -iet \ q statute, 5^ -
*
 5
„ ' •' ine iav.c -ociates originally 
purchased the property at the sale^ • • t-r 
redeemed out. by the LRS(|I does nol' change this effect 
s I n c e t:!") e pP ri i n en t po r 1" i on s o f § 5 7 -1 - 3 2 majve no 
distinction between a purchasing or » nonpurchasing 
junior 1ienor, 
§57-1-32 \ *. A does ny' app„.y s. o unfv. reclosmo 
junior 1 ienor the fair mar<et provisions of that statute 
HI note ^^ea ^r e, *. , the ^a ~d JUL,IJ. i iei oi * 
^erurity was lost bv reaso -* f defaults cf 
the appe . . .- asocial- •'. . 
loss of the security. There was also no breach of any 
duty by Associates, Therefore, the One-Action Rule does 
not apply to this action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS ACTION IS NOT GOVERNED BY §57-1-32 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SINCE THIS IS NOT AN 
ACTION FOR A DEFICIENCY. 
City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 
(Utah 1991) is controlling on the interpretation of §57-
1-32, U.C.A. The court, in recognizing that the 3-month 
rule did not apply to a non-foreclosing junior lien 
holder, stated the following: 
We have not heretofore had occasion to 
determine whether the fair market value 
limitation of section 57-1-32 applies to a 
"sold out nonforeclosing junior lienor." 
However, the Utah Court of Appeals, in a 
recent decision, declined to apply the three-
month limitation contained in section 57-1-3 2 
to a nonforeclosing junior. G. Adams Ltd. 
Partnership v. Durbano, 782 P.2d 962 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) . The court reasoned that the 
statute only applied to a creditor who had 
foreclosed. Since the second lienor had not 
foreclosed, section 57-1-32 did not apply. 
Id. at 963. 
Consistent with this ruling, we hold that 
since City, a sold-out junior, is unsecured, 
it is not pursuing a "deficiency judgment" 
and, therefore, the statute would not apply. 
10 
As a result, City Is not 1 imited'by the fair 
market value provision of section |57-l-3 2 from 
pursuing its claim, • against the debtor 
personally. Id. at 239 
The :y Consumer Services v . Peters case ^sc 
define- , . " *v 
"creditor originally secured b\ ^ seou.-d Lien against 
.J property but nnqpcur^d as * r-su t. of tne senior's 
forec- - * Id. 
lien position tr tr^r . t a i : k,i.;J, ta,, 
taa'tn T'rrpleted * "irerlosure which pxtinquishea trr-
r,s *:;*-*• definition ot -» ^unior lienor*1, A-
d %-l-*. *• - .
 : -~ iir'-r \?*cc,i+,c:s \*a& -r-4- pursuing a 
^ ic^ eiicy ;uug..v. * v. ^ 1,^1. :,.a^;.- and m t : ..fore, 
§57-1-32 would net ,u.*oly. 
The - * * —. 
^ e property nt -.ne sc^e, <«* was .ater redee^ec ^ .. • . 
the IPS 1o^^ -jf ^  chanqe this pffec s'n, e the pertinent 
p " 
purchasing onpurchasing *un -r lienor. §57-.-.,. 
states Lxie loilowing: 
J 1 
At any time within three months after any sale 
of property under a trust deed as hereinafter 
provided, an action may be commenced to 
recover the balance due on the obligation for 
which the trust deed was given as security and 
in such action the complaint shall set forth 
the entire amount of the indebtedness which 
was secured by such trust deed . . . (emphasis 
added). 
The language of the code clearly does not apply to a lien 
holder other than the one who has foreclosed its interest 
in the property. 
The appellant has cited and relied heavily on the 
reasoning of the case of Citrus State Bank v. McKendrick, 
215 Cal. 3d 941, 263 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. App. , 2 Dist., 
1989) . However, this case is not controlling since the 
City Consumer v. Peters case has interpreted the lav; for 
Utah. But, the Citrus State Bank case follows the same 
reasoning as the City Consumer case. The court stated: 
Thus a sold out junior lienor whose interest 
is lost by virtue of a senior foreclosure is 
free to sue directly on his unpaid and now 
unsecured note and is not encumbered by the 
provisions of section 580(a). That is, the 
amount of the deficiency is not limited. 
There is no need to obtain a fair market 
appraisal of the secured property and it is 
not necessary that an action be commenced 
within three months of the foreclosure sale. 
Id. at 784. 
12 
It is true that the Citrus State Bank case holds 
that the purchase of the secured property by a junior 
lienor caused the junior lienor to be governed by the 
deficiency action rule. This is because the court 
reasoned that a purchaser should not gain the advantage 
of receiving the security and also have the right to take 
an action for the balance unless the deficiency action 
rule applies. However, the Citrus State Bank situation 
does not correspond to our case. Associates did not 
receive the property and also bring an action for a 
deficiency. Prior to the commencement of the action, 
Associates was redeemed out of the property by the IRS 
and was left with only a partial payment toward the debt. 
R.154. 
A redemption, by definition, is lfa repurchase; 
a buying back... The process of annulling and revoking a 
conditional sale of property, by performance of the 
conditions on which it was stipulated to be revoked." 
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition (19?9) . Thus by the 
redemption, the act of bidding at the sale by Associates 
was cancelled out, annulled and revoked. The effect is 
13 
as though the IRS made the high bid at sale in the amount 
of $26,000.00. 
II. 
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE 
PROPERTY IS NOT RELEVANT TO THIS 
ACTION AND, THEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT OF 
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES SHOULD NOT BE 
LIMITED THROUGH ANY EXAMINATION REGARDING 
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY. 
The appellants, throughout their brief, have 
referred to and relied upon an analysis of the value of 
the property. It is clear that the value of the property 
was not an issue at the trial since the value was not 
finally established as part of the stipulated facts. 
R.153. It should also be noted that the timing of a 
right of redemption of the IRS is not consistent with the 
three month limitation for a deficiency action. The IRS 
has 120-days to redeem and the rule of §57-1-32 only 
provides for three months to take action. Therefore, 
under the appellants1 reasoning, a junior, lienholder who 
might opt for retention of property in lieu of a lawsuit 
would be left without a right of action if a redemption 
occurs more than 90 days but less than 12 0 days after the 
sale. 
14 
Since fair market -a,.if w-is neither finally 
etaLdbl " - ^e 
trial court an<i since Associates qxi-jiiiitrs as ci sui i out 
iunior lienor the fair n**rket -^ visions ~* §5*?-;-32 
also do ' j-pi; ir
 At c .n »H r.« ~ u; ** • ne 
property. There simply is no risk * hat Associates would 
"~ - -
 #-a7 ** )S w e n d^ ^ n 
opportunity A^dii, n ,*~ .. ncienc> necanse of - e 
prior rviemnt>^ 
~- -.+ • x Con sumer S e rv ices 
deficiency action , , r.ot r^ruired under 
55^-1-^ then *-**» »f=>ir
 w a^ K e t valv^" provisions of §57-
* -roperly requested *..* examination of the fair market 
value of the real estate. 
III. 
'" E "ONE ACTION RULE" DOES NOT BAH 
APPELLEE FROM RECOVERY OF THE AMOUNT:, 
DUE UNDER ITS NOTE, 
.i , . -prerne, wwui'; made . . abundantly clear that 
- Action Rule*1 as es* iblished y Utah Code 
Annotated - - ~ ;,--- - .=: r-" , -stances where 
the security has oeen . • -> , _s vdxucl^oo. Cache Valley 
15 
Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453, 618 P.2d 43, 45 
(Utah 1980) and Lockhart Co. v. Eguitable Realty Inc., 
657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983). In the case of Utah Mortgage 
& Loan Company v. Black, 618 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1980) the 
Court stated, in speaking of the "One Action Rule1", as 
follows: 
When the security has been lost or disposed of 
without any fault or blameworthy conduct on 
the part of the creditor. . .an action may be 
brought on the note without going through a 
fruitless procedure of foreclosure on non-
existent security. 
In the case now before this court, an action in 
foreclosure would be fruitless since Associates has 
already lost its security on the property through the 
nonjudicial foreclosure by the senior lienor. Appellants 
are trying to shift their blameworthy conduct and burdens 
to the appellee. The existence of the federal tax liens, 
under which redemption occurred, was a result of a 
failure on the part of the Slaughs — the failure to pay 
taxes. Slaughs were also in default under the first 
trust deed on the property. That default resulted in the 
foreclosure. Associates had nothing to do with the 
defaults and tax delinquency of Slaughs. 
16 
The U S District Or- •*• First ! Security Bank of 
Utah, N A, v. E elger, ) 
stated: 
The cour b - found that a creditor is 
precluded from seeking a defi c:i ency only where 
the creditor's negligence, or illegal conduct, 
has resulted in the loss of the collateral, or 
where the •creditor voluntarily released the 
junior lien, (emphasis added). 
The appellants have not asserted that Associates engaged 
j i 1 ax i] :! Il 3 ega ] uondi ic: "t They do c 1 a i in, that Associates 
; i as negligent. 
In order for a claim, of negligence to appl y, there 
Binst 1 :: = a ::i'i i t::;; , :: :!: c: :ai: «= t 1ill jams v , I leH: > , • 59 9 I >" 2 1 7 9 3 
(U t a h II 9 8 5) • S ince t::l I = f i r s t e s s ent i a 1 el emen t o f 
i legl igence i s a duty of reasonable care by a defendant to 
t\ p.I a i n t :i f £ , i 1: :i s i lecessar ;y for ap |; el ] ai i ts t :: se t: for th 
a leg a] standard for the duty they C/aim Associates owed. 
Associates " a 
foreclosure Sdic, Associates owed ;,o dat> at tne tiiucr ": 
bidding to bic an amount taat approximated the value et 
the proper 
determine tndt i..fr .*?~*^ ». , amouj ^t t * oy t.iti IkS ^av 
not have been higher. Arguably , if Associates had not 
bid $26,000, the judgment which has now been entered 
against the Slaughs would be for a higher sum. 
Therefore, Slaughs obtained the benefit by the bidding. 
The facts show that the security was lost because 
the Slaughs failed to keep the first note and trust deed 
current. No matter what happened at the sale, the 
security would have been lost. Whether Associates bid 
higher, or not at all, the sale still would have been 
concluded. Therefore, the security was not lost because 
of any conduct of Associates. It was lost because the 
Slaughs allowed the default and incurred the liability 
for federal tax liens. It is rather impertinent now for 
the Slaughs to claim that the loss of the security 
occurred as a result of some breach of an unknown duty by 
Associates. 
The City Consumer Services case also makes it clear 
that the "One Action Rule" does not apply to a "sold out 
junior lienor." This court stated: 
Our Cache Valley decision, that the one-action 
rule does not apply to a "sold out junior," is 
consistent with the purpose of the one-action 
rule to bar multiple suits against a debtor 
who has defaulted. It is well established 
that statutes should be construed and applied 
in accordance with their legislative purpose. 
18 
Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980). As 
a result, we hold today that the one-action 
rule does not apply to the facts of this case 
to deny the junior lienor its right to 
recover. The purpose of the one-action rule 
is to regulate the procedure of recovery of a 
secured creditor, not to deny the creditor's 
contract right to recover on its loan. 
Therefore, when a junior becomes unsecured due 
to foreclosure by the senior lienor, the 
junior is not barred bv the one-action rule 
from proceeding against the debtor on the 
note. since the creditor's status as to 
security is determined at the timq the suit is 
brought, (emphasis added). Id. ajb 237. 
At the time the suit was brought in this action, the 
property had been redeemed by the II^ S. It had been 
foreclosed and lost through a foreclosure by Utah 
Mortgage, not Associates, and was not controlled or owned 
by Associates. 
Associates can not be chargeable with fault in 
receiving the redemption price paid by the IRS. Title 
28, U.S.C, §2410(d) reads as follows: 
In any case in which the United States redeems 
real property under this section or section 
7425 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the 
amount to be paid for such property shall be 
the sum of — 
(1) the actual amount paid bv the purchaser 
at such sale (which, in the case of a 
purchaser who is the holder of th£ lien being 
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foreclosed, shall include the amount of the 
obligation secured by such lien to the extent 
satisfied by reason of such sale), 
(2) interest on the amount paid (as 
determined under paragraph (1) at 6 per cent 
per annum from the date of such sale, and 
(3) the amount (if any) equal to the excess 
of (A) the expenses necessarily incurred in 
connection with such property, over (B) the 
income from such property plus (to the extent 
such property is used by the purchaser) a 
reasonable rental value of such property. 
(emphasis Added). 
There is nothing in the language of §2410(d) that makes 
it clear that Associates was entitled to any amount over 
and above the redemption paid of $26,000.00, plus 6% 
interest. 
It is hereby acknowledged by appellant that the Bank 
of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981) 
has interpreted §2410(d)(1) differently than the strict 
construction of the language of §2410(d) would suggest. 
Therefore, it appears that Associates may have been able 
to demand a higher redemption amount than the IRS paid. 
However, it does not necessarily follow that Associates 
must seek the highest possible redemption price from the 
IRS in the event of a redemption. Again, this would 
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impose a duty upon Associates which does not exist at 
law. Associates acted reasonably in tjie receipt of the 
redemption price paid and should not bd required to have 
sued the IRS in order to receive a higher payment just in 
order to reduce the claim under the note signed by the 
Slaughs. 
If Associates were bound by the ff|one Action Rule", 
it would lead to a senseless, fruitless, and redundant 
trustee's sale on the property which has already been 
foreclosed and lost to the IRS through redemption. 
Associates would record a notice of default and conduct 
a foreclosure sale under which it would bid zero. The 
parties would then be back in court to claim a deficiency 
for the same amounts which are set forth in the judgment 
that was already entered. This is alp. the more reason 
not to create a new duty of care on a junior lienor 
during the bidding process at the sale of a senior lien. 
CONCLUSION 
As a "sold out junior lienor", Associates is not 
bound by the deficiency action rule o^ §57-1-32, U.C.A. 
The fact that Associates purchased at the sale and was 
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later redeemed out of the property should not create a 
new exception to the general rule, especially when the 
IRS redemptions occur after the expiration of three 
months and prior to the commencement of the lawsuit. 
No duty of care exists for a junior lien holder at 
the foreclosure sale of a senior lien, because the sale 
of the senior lien will extinguish the other liens on the 
property, no matter what a junior lienor does. The 
Slaughs had the duty of care to protect the property from 
foreclosure so that the lien of Associates would not be 
extinguished. The Slaughs1 breach of their duty of care 
should not be ignored or shifted to a party that was not 
foreclosing the trust deed. The mere fact that 
Associates may have been able to obtain a higher 
redemption through the IRS or through the bidding on the 
property and subsequent sale thereof, does not constitute 
negligence or fault within the meaning of §78-37-1, 
U.C.A. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of March, 
«AN7W. CANNON 
At-^ oimey for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE! 
I do hereby declare that I caiised to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, four (4) copies of Appellee's Brief to 
the following on the ^Ql day of March, 1992: 
Franklin L. Slaugh, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
9341 South 1300 East 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and 
CHERYL D. SLAUGH, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890906166 
JUDGE UNO 
1-9,1 -<io-%na^ 
This matter came on regularly for oral argument before 
the above entitled Court on June 22, 1990 before the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno. The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that plaintiff is hereby 
granted judgment against defendants as follows: 
1. For Judgment in the principal sum of $2 6,087.71, 
together with interest in the sum of $3,848.13. 
2. For a reasonable attorney's fee in the sum of 
$3,000.00. 
APPENDIX "A" 
The total Judgment of $32,935.84 shall bear interest .at 
the rate of 18% until paid in fullv 
DATED this QT day of jJoaeJ tef 1990. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
003S8 
BRYAN W. CANNON, #0561 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
40 East South Temple, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2100 
Tr..ro JuciiCiAi C'stnct 
JUL 1 5 1990 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and 
CHERYL D. SLAUGH, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 890906166 
JUDGE UNO 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for oral 
argument on the 22nd day of June, 1990, before the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno at the hour of 9:00 A.M. Bryan W. Cannon appeared 
for the plaintiff, and Franklin L. Slaugh appeared pro se and as 
attorney for Cheryl D. Slaugh. Based upon the stipulations of fact 
and oral arguments of counsel, the Court hereby enters its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendants, Franklin and Cheryl Slaugh (Slaughs), 
entered into a loan agreement with plaintiff, Associates Financial 
1 
Services (Associates), on or about November 26, 1982. 
2. The loan agreement included a note in the amount of 
$33,104.14, plus interest accruing as shown in the Note. 
3. The note was secured by a trust deed on real 
property located at 8620 South Gladiator Way, Sandy, Utah. 
4. The lien of Associates was a second mortgage on the 
property. 
5. The senior lien was in favor of Utah Mortgage Loan 
Corporation (Utah Mortgage). 
6. Prior to February of 1989, Slaughs went into default 
on the Utah Mortgage trust deed but did not go into default on the 
Associates trust deed. 
7. Because of Slaughs1 default, Utah Mortgage commenced 
a non-judicial foreclosure and eventually conducted a trustee's 
sale on the real property. 
8. The trustee's sale occurred on February 28, 1989. 
Associates appeared at the sale and bid an amount of $26,000.00 as 
the high bid. The amount owing to Utah Mortgage was approximately 
$20,000.00 at the time of the sale. 
9. The value of the real property at the time of sale 
was more than $40,000.00, although the exapt market value has not 
been established. 
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10. At the time of the foreclosure sale there were 
unreleased federal tax liens against Slaughs which were also liens 
on the real estate. 
11. The branch manager of Associates, who attended the 
sale, did not actually know about the federal tax liens, although 
they were of record. 
12. Associates' file on Slaughs was in Dallas, Texas at 
the time of the sale. The file did have a copy of a title report 
that identified the federal tax liens. 
13. Under federal law, the IRS has a 120-day right of 
redemption on any trustee's sale when a lien is in place. As a 
result of the 120 day right of redemption, the IRS paid Associates 
the sum of $26,000.00 within 120-days of the sale to cover the high 
bid at sale. 
14. The IRS took title to the real property under the 
redemption and wiped out any interest of Associates in the 
property. The net proceeds of the redemption to Associates was 
approximately $5,700.00, which amount was applied to the account 
of Slaughs to reduce the balance owing. 
15. The balance of the Note and Trust Deed, after 
redemption, was the sum of $26,089.71, together with interest from 
September 1989 pursuant to the terms of the note. 
3 
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16. No payments have been made by Slaughs to Associates 
since the redemption by the IRS. 
17. The Note provides for an award of attorney1s fees 
in the event it is necessary to enforce collection of the Note. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Associates, as a junior lien purchaser at the sale 
of a senior trust deed is not bound by the Section 57-1-32, Utah 
Code Annotated, 3-month right of action rulp when the IRS exercises 
a 120-day right of redemption. 
2. Section 78-37-1, Utah Code Annotated ("One-Action-
Rule") did not require Associates to first conduct a non-judicial 
foreclosure before bringing its action for the balance of its debt, 
since the security was lost, not through the fault of Associates, 
but because of failures by Slaughs. 
3. Plaintiff, Associates, is entitled to a Judgment 
against Slaughs in the sum of $26,089.71, together with interest 
from and after September of 1989 pursuant to the terms of the Note 
and for a reasonable attorney's fee for prosecution of this action. 
DATED this <2~* day of July, 1990. 
BY THE COURll: 
^^x^^^-^-^e^^ ^  ^yOof^t^ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this ^-7 day of 
July, 1990, to the following: 
Franklin L. Slaugh, Esq. 
Pro Se and as 
Attorney for Cheryl Slaugh 
9341 South 1300 East 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
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JUL 0 2 1990 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and 
CHERYL D. SLAUGH, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 890906166 
This matter came on for bench trial on the 22nd day of 
June, 1990. The parties stipulated to the facts and agreed 
that the case could be tried based on opal argument of counsel 
only. After argument of counsel, the Court took the matter 
under advisement. The Court now being fully advised and good 
cause appearing therefore, rules as follows. 
Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment against the defendants in 
the sum of $26,089.71 together with interest from September 
1989 pursuant to terms of the note, minus any offsets 
defendants can legally assert. 
The Court agrees with plaintiff's contention that since the 
IRS became the purchaser of the property from the closure, 
ASSOCIATES V. SLAUGH PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Associates should not be bound by the three month right of 
action rule, nor should Associates be required to first conduct 
a non-judicial foreclosure before bringing an action for the 
balance of its debt, since the security was lost, not through 
the fault of Associates, but because of failures by 
defendants. 
Plaintiff is to prepare the Order. 
Dated this^X&) day of July, 1990. 
J 
RAYMONti S. UNO C 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ASSOCIATES V. SLAUGH PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this ^£(_dav of July, 1990: 
Bryan W. Cannon 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
40 E. South Temple, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Franklin L. Slaugh 
Pro se 
9341 South 1300 East 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
